Information hiding techniques allow a player to hide secret information in some innocent-looking document. In this paper we present a novel approach to information hiding. We investigate the possibility of embedding information using the intrinsic entropy of some classes of cover-documents. In particular we provide algorithms for embedding any binary string in an image mosaic (i.e. an image consisting of a mosaic of smaller images). The algorithms presented allow different levels of security for the information hidden in the cover-document. We also show some techniques to reduce the amount of information the users have to secretly store.
INTRODUCTION
The need for secure communication has existed since ancient times. To solve this problem two major disciplines were studied: cryptography and information hiding.
One of the major applications of cryptography is, for example, the task of sending secret messages between two allies which, even if intercepted by an enemy, cannot be understood (by the enemy). This problem was of relevance even in ancient times. Indeed the first documented example of cryptography is dated approximatively 1900 BC and is due to an Egyptian Scribe [1] . However, during World War II, cryptography was considered as an art more than a science and thus cryptographic schemes were frequently broken.
With the growth of communication networks, the problem of communication in the presence of adversaries became one of the basic issues in distributed systems research. One of the classic goals of cryptography is the privacy of communication. Private communication can be seen as a game among three players, a sender, Alice, a receiver, Bob, and an adversary, Carol. Alice and Bob wish to communicate privately, so that Carol knows nothing about what was communicated. For a long time, the most used cryptographic schemes have been the so-called substitution encryption schemes. The core of these schemes is a codebook that actually contains for each word in the plaintext the corresponding word in the ciphertext. Thus a necessary condition to send an encrypted message is that both Alice and Bob must share the same codebook. There are a lot of variants of this basic substitution scheme; however, all of them suffer the same problem, the huge codebook the players must secretly store. During the last 20 years, after the introduction of what is known as modern cryptography [2, 3, 4] , the need for codebooks has disappeared as the security of the encryption schemes is 1 Corresponding author.
based on some complexity assumption, i.e. the difficulty of computing some particular tasks such as factoring large numbers, computing discrete logarithms in some fields and so on.
One of the main features of cryptographic schemes is that the encryption procedure must be randomized to ensure privacy. Indeed, it can be shown that if an encryption scheme is deterministic (i.e. non-randomized) then it cannot be considered secure (see [5] for a more detailed description). In other words, the encrypted message will look like a random string of bits. For this reason, there are some circumstances in which the use of encryption schemes is not allowed because it immediately reveals that something 'secret' has been communicated.
For this reason, since antiquity people have concentrated on the study of the discipline of information hiding, i.e. on the possibility of hiding a secret message in an innocent-looking one instead of merely encrypting the secret information. Examples of this effort can be found in [6, 7, 8] . See [9] for an excellent survey on the topic.
An important sub-discipline of information hiding is steganography. A steganographic scheme is a way to embed information in some document in such a way that the existence of hidden information is also hidden. The first known systematic study on this subject is Trithemius' Steganographyae.
One of the schemes proposed by Trithemius was to substitute each letter in the secret phrase with a word or a phrase. The association between letters and words/phrases was contained in a table and was such that the 'encoding' of any possible plaintext resulted in a sort of magic spell or prayer.
A classical example in which the use of steganographic schemes is necessary to solve communication problems is the so-called prisoner problem introduced in [10] . Two prisoners want to prepare an escape plan from jail, but all their communications are monitored by the policemen. Now, if they 'encrypt' the messages, then the policemen HIDING INFORMATION IN IMAGE MOSAICS   203 will immediately detect that something strange is going on and they will take proper countermeasures. In this case, the prisoners need a way to hide the information they want to exchange in some innocent-looking messages such that, even if the policemen hear all the messages, they do not even suspect what the prisoners are planning.
From the above discussion we can deduce that any cryptographic algorithm maps a string, the plaintext, into another string, the ciphertext, that must be pseudo-random. Notice that we do not make any assumption about the document that will undergo the encryption, in the sense that we can encrypt a text as well as a binary file, that already 'seems' pseudo-random.
On the other hand, each steganographic scheme hides information (the embedded-string) into a document (the coverdocument) without relevantly altering the information contained in it. This means that if we hide information in a nonrandom document, e.g. a text, the resulting document must be a non-random document while if we hide information in a pseudo-random document, e.g. a compressed file, the result must be pseudo-random, e.g. a compressed file. In particular, the output document of the steganographic scheme must contain almost the 'same information' as the input one.
These differences could be actually seen as the impossibility of using any cryptographic primitive in steganographic schemes.
The basic observation we make in this work is the following. If we use a pseudo-random document as input for an encryption scheme, the output of the encryption algorithm is pseudo-random. If we use a pseudo-random document as cover-document in a steganographic scheme, the output of this algorithm must be pseudo-random, too. This means that if the input of both the schemes is a pseudorandom document, then the output of both must be a pseudorandom document. The major problem is that steganography wants to hide to an attacker the fact that information is hidden in a document too. So, if the attacker sees that Alice sends to Bob a pseudo-random document, he will immediately suspect that there is some hidden information in it. This could be avoided by properly choosing the coverdocument used. In [11] the authors show how to embed any file in a raid of pseudo-random cover-files, without relevantly altering their pseudo-randomness. On the other hand, we notice that the authors 'forced', in a certain sense, the cover-documents to be pseudo-random. Indeed, no disk drive stores the information by randomizing it. This means that an attacker can immediately detect that some information is hidden in the disks.
Thus, we are searching for a class of documents that are 'naturally' pseudo-random and such that their nonrandomness is immediately recognizable or, in any case, checkable. This means that if we use a compressed file as cover-file, the output of the embedding function must be a compressed file, too, i.e. there must exist some (public) program that can correctly uncompress it. Usually, when dealing with images, the 'public program' is the human visual system. Several papers present results in steganography using images as cover-documents (for instance, see [12] ). The schemes presented in these works embed information into images by slightly modifying them in such a way that the human eye cannot see the difference. This is done by modifying some information in the image representation or in its transformed representation.
One of the simplest methods of hiding information in an image is to alter the least significant bits in the bit plane representation of the image. Examples of this technique can be found in [13, 14] . However, such methods are vulnerable in the sense that unauthorized parties can simply recover the information hidden in an image. Due to this problem the authors in [15, 16, 17] developed some techniques that require the original cover-image for the retrieving phase of the information.
Another approach has been used by the authors in [12, 18] . The techniques described in these papers select some pixels of the image using a pseudo-random generator and alter their luminance.
In this paper we consider a particular class of pseudorandom images: the image mosaics described in the next section. We shall show that it is possible to use this class of images as cover-documents in a steganographic scheme. We have not implemented the schemes presented and thus this work leaves open an experimental verification of the algorithms presented.
PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION
In this section we briefly review the basic terminology that we will use throughout this paper. We will give a brief description of cryptographic primitives, information hiding schemes, image databases and mosaics.
Cryptosystems
Informally, a cryptosystem can be seen as a game among three players: a sender, Alice, a receiver, Bob, and an adversary, Carol. Alice wants to send a message m to Bob in a private way, where 'private' means that only Bob can 'understand' that message. Unfortunately, Alice and Bob are connected by means of an insecure channel that is a communication line that can be read by Carol, too. The only way they have to accomplish this task is to encode the message m into a message m in such a way that Bob can recover m from m , but Carol cannot get any information on the value of m.
A cryptosystem can be seen as a 5-tuple (P, C, K, E, D) where P is the plaintext space, C is the ciphertext space, K is the key space, E is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that, on input of a key and a plaintext, outputs a ciphertext and D is the inverse of E.
For an encryption scheme to be secure, the ciphertexts obtained by different encryptions of the same plaintext must be different. Moreover, the ciphertexts obtained from the encryptions must be computationally indistinguishable from a random string (see [5, 19] ). The encryption (respectively, decryption) algorithm takes as input an encryption (respectively, decryption) key k and the plaintext (respectively, the ciphertext) and outputs the ciphertext (respectively, the plaintext).
Cryptosystems can be partitioned in two classes.
• Private key or symmetric cryptosystems. For this class of cryptosystems, the players must share a common key k ∈ K and the encryption/decryption algorithms must be such that, for any k ∈ K and p ∈ P, it holds that
For private key cryptosystems, the players must share a common key with each other player they want to privately communicate with.
• Public key or asymmetric cryptosystems. In this case, each player holds a pair k = (k 1 , k 2 ) of keys; where k 1 is the secret part of the key and k 2 is the public one. The keys and the encryption and decryption algorithms must be such that for any
For public key cryptosystems, each player holds his own secret key and uses the public key of the receiver to encrypt the message he is going to send.
In this paper we only consider symmetric cryptosystems.
Pseudo-random bit generators
A pseudo-random bit generator (PRBG) G is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a sequence of random bits of length k, referred to as seed, and 'stretches' it into a new sequence of bits of length , with k, that 'appears' to be random.
The fact that the PRBG is deterministic means that given as input the same seed, the algorithm always returns the same output sequence. Notice that the output of the generator is not random. Indeed, the PRBG can output only a small fraction, namely 2 k /2 , of all the possible strings of length .
The intent of PRBGs is to stretch the seed to obtain a longer sequence such that no adversary can efficiently distinguish between the output of the PRBG and a truly random sequence of the same length.
A PRBG G is said to pass the next-bit test if there exists no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that takes as input the first t bits of the output sequence s of G and outputs the (t + 1)th bit of s with probability greater than 1/2 or, in other words, the adversary cannot do better than guessing the value of the bit t + 1 in the sequence. Of course, the probability that the adversary correctly guesses bits in the sequence is upper bounded by 1/2 . Given a PRBG it is possible to construct a pseudo-random sequence of numbers between 0 and n − 1 by picking log n + 1 bits and converting them into an integer. If the resulting number is greater than n−1 then it can be discarded and the process repeated.
Collision free hash function
A hash function is any probabilistic polynomial time computable mapping h that associates an input x of arbitrary finite length to an output h(x) of fixed length m. The function h is said to be collision free if it is computationally infeasible to find two distinct points x 1 and x 2 such that h(x 1 ) = h(x 2 ).
Steganographic schemes
We briefly review the terminology used for steganographic schemes that was agreed upon during the first workshop on information hiding [20] .
A steganographic scheme is a way to embed information in some document in such a way that the existence of hidden information is also hidden. The role of a steganographic scheme is to hide the fact that two players, Alice and Bob, are communicating secret information using 'innocentlooking' documents. Thus, an attack to a steganographic scheme is successful even if an adversary Carol can somehow detect that Alice and Bob are playing this game.
The steganographic scheme can be represented as in Figure 1 and is composed of a pair of efficient algorithms: the embedding algorithm, Em, used to hide the information and the extracting algorithm, Ex, used to extract them.
The embedding algorithm takes as input the stego-key, the steganographic counterpart of the classical encryption key, the cover-document, the document that will contain the hidden information, and the embedded data, the string that we want to hide. The word 'document' in coverdocument is usually replaced by the type of the document used, e.g. cover-text if it is a text, cover-image, if it is an image and so on. The output of the embedding algorithm is called the stego-object. Also in this case, 'object' is substituted by the actual type of object, e.g. stego-text, stegoimage and so on.
Once the receiver obtains the stego-object, they can extract the hidden information using the extracting algorithm Ex. This algorithm takes as inputs the stego-document and the stego-key and outputs the embedded data.
Image databases
With the growth of the World Wide Web, people now have access to tens of thousands of digital images, that can be collected in large databases. One of the basic problems in this case is to retrieve particular images from these databases.
According to the classic automatic information retrieval paradigm, a database is organized into documents that can be retrieved via synthetic indices, in turn organized in a data structure for rapid lookup and retrieval. The user formulates their information retrieval problem as an expression in a query language. The query is translated into the language of indices, the resulting index is matched against those in the database and the documents containing the matched indices are retrieved.
One possible solution to the indexing problem in a database of images could be to identify each image with one or more keywords. However, such an approach should be avoided for certain reasons. First, the classification should be done interactively and this will not be, of course, a good strategy for large databases. Moreover, as pointed out by the authors in [21] , describing some pictorial properties of some images could be difficult and, at the same time, some other properties could be described in different ways.
In the last few years, some techniques have been developed to allow the automatic indexing of image databases using 'keywords' related to the represented images. Roughly, these techniques extract some information from the image and use this information as 'keywords' for image indexing and lookup. All the information related to an image, namely the keywords and a pointer to the image in the database, are stored in an index file associated with the image database. The size of the index file is smaller than the size of the database because the keywords extracted from the image are a sort of short representation of the image itself. The index file is arranged in such a way that the lookup operation can be efficiently performed. Of course, in these cases, the query that the user will formulate to the database is an image itself and is performed by extracting the specified information from the image and then searching for these keywords in the index file.
For a more detailed description of content-based image retrieval systems see [21, 22, 23 ].
Mosaics of images
A classical mosaic is a set of small coloured stones arranged in such a way that, if they are seen from a distance, they compose a larger image. This artistic expression is based on the property of the human visual system that 'sees' the colour of a region as the average colour of that region. Indeed, if the distance between two points is below a certain threshold, the human eye sees only one point whose colour is the average colour of the original ones.
The Photomosaics 2 created by Silvers are based on the same property (see [24] for a more detailed description). Photomosaics are mosaics in which the coloured stones are substituted by small photos. Silvers wrote a computer program that, starting from a database of small photos, called tiles images, catalogues these images according to some characteristics, like colour, shape, contrast and many others. To create the Photomosaic of a target picture, the software partitions the target into macro-pixels and then substitutes each of them with an image in the database that best matches its characteristics. An example of Photomosaic 3 is presented in Figure 2 .
Other examples of image mosaics can be found in [25] where the authors describe a process to automatically 206 C. BLUNDO AND C. GALDI generate image mosaics. The major difference between the Silvers' Photomosaics and the image mosaics presented in [25] is the size of the tiles. An example of an image mosaic is given in Figure 3 .
Notice that currently the generation of the image mosaics is not completely automatic. The 'creation' of image mosaics is considered as an artistic expression. Thus, the authors automatically generate a first 'draft' of the image mosaic and then modify it by hand in order to meet some personal criteria.
Another crucial point for automatic generation of the image mosaics is the size of the tiles. Indeed, if the size of the tiles grows too much with respect to the size of the image, the mosaic generated can not faithfully represent the target image (e.g. the target image resolution will dramatically decrease).
THE SCHEMES
In the previous section we have described what a mosaic of photographs is. Here we will describe a scheme that allows one to embed any secret information in such an image. For the sake of simplicity, we suppose that the mosaic M is a black and white picture, i.e. each tile of the mosaic can be seen as encoding a black region or a white one. We will later describe a generalization of this technique to the case of coloured mosaics.
More formally, we can see a mosaic M as an array of n tiles images, M 1 , . . . , M n . Each tile image M i can be classified as belonging to one of the two classes of images either C 0 or C 1 , where C 0 (respectively, C 1 ) contains images that encodes a white region (respectively, a black region). We suppose that Alice and Bob have agreed upon the two classes of tiles, i.e. they both hold these two databases of images and they both hold a classification algorithm CLASS that, on input M i , outputs an index j such that M i ∈ C j . As a simple example of the classification algorithm, consider the following algorithm for black and white images. Each image is composed of pixels that can be either black or white. The classification algorithm computes the fraction of the white pixels and assigns the image to the class C 0 (respectively, C 1 ) if this fraction is above a threshold t 1 (respectively, below a threshold t 2 , with t 1 > t 2 ). For the sake of simplicity, suppose that these databases have the same size s = 2 t , for some t (we will relax this assumption later). Moreover, Alice and Bob have a standard ordering rule on each class of images, i.e. there exist four functions, known to both the players, f j : {0, 1, . . . , s − 1} → C j , the embedding functions, and g j : C j → {0, 1, . . . , s − 1}, the extracting functions, with j = 0, 1, such that for each P in C j it results that f j (g j (P )) = P and for each i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s − 1} it holds that g j (f j (i)) = i. In other words, each image in the databases C 0 and C 1 is associated to a unique number in {0, 1, . . . , s − 1}.
Let X be the message Alice wants to send to Bob and let x 1 , . . . , x be its binary representation, where = vt for some integer v ≤ n. In the following, INT is a function that takes as input a binary string b and returns as output an integer whose binary representation is b, and BIN is its inverse function. Alice will use the algorithm presented in Figure 4 .
It can be easily seen that information that the mosaic represents, i.e. the image encoded in the mosaic, does not change, since the transformation Alice applies to the mosaic simply substitutes a tile image of the mosaic with another one belonging to the same class. We are just changing an image 'representing' white with a (possibly different) image also representing white.
The algorithm Bob has to use to 'decode' the mosaic is presented in Figure 5 . This algorithm scans the tile images of the mosaic M one by one from M 1 to M n . Each M i is classified using the CLASS algorithm and the proper extracting function is applied to M i to recover the unique number associated to it. The binary representation of this number is then appended to the binary string constructed.
It can be seen immediately that if v < n then Bob will decode the message X with some random elements R appended to it. To avoid this, Alice could append to X some special termination symbol. Moreover, notice that the scheme presented is deterministic. This means that if X = 0 , where 0 is a string composed of zeros and = vt, then the scheme will substitute the first v tiles in the mosaic with the tiles encoding 0 t in C 0 or C 1 , depending on the class the substituted tile belongs to. In Figure 6 we report an example that clarifies this problem. In this example, n = 25, v = 18 and the message we want to embed is the all zeros message (i.e. 
Notice that each block is the binary representation of an integer in {0, 1, . . . , 2 t − 1}. Algorithm Extract(M) or C 1 . Of course, this situation should be avoided because the resulting mosaic will immediately reveal to an attacker that something strange is going on. In Section 3.5 we show an algorithm that randomizes the sequence of tiles that are substituted by the embedding function.
For
To evaluate the maximum length of X that it is possible to embed in a mosaic, we suppose that the mosaic is composed of n tiles and that the sets C 0 and C 1 contain s images. Since each tile image 'encodes' log s bits of X , we can embed in the mosaic n log s bits. We call this quantity the capacity of the mosaic M.
Implementing the functions f and g
It is not hard to see that the embedding and extracting functions f and g are two of the basic ingredients of the algorithms. Recall that these function are defined as follows:
A simple way to implement these functions is to 'embed' them in the image database by adding to each image a field containing a (unique) number in {0, 1, . . . , s − 1} in a preprocessing phase.
This simple process ensures that each image in a certain class is associated with a unique identifier that ranges from 0 to s − 1. Thus, the implementation of f is actually a query to C with key equal to the input of f . On the other hand, the implementation of g is a query to C, too. The difference between these two requests is that, for the function g, the query is an image, thus the retrieval procedure will work in this case as described in Section 2.
Reducing the size of private databases
In this section we show how to reduce the size of information that must be privately stored by Alice and Bob. We have seen that the security of the schemes presented depends on the fact that the image databases are private to both parties. For this reason, we would like the size of the database to be small. On the other hand, the generation of image mosaics that 'visually' represent any object could require a large database of tiles. As an example, we could consider publicly available software for automatic mosaic generation that already has a large database of tiles. In this case, we need to keep this database private.
Let DB be the database of all the tiles, i.e. DB = C 0 ∪ C 1 , where C 0 contains tiles that encode white and C 1 contains tiles that encode black. Let C 0 ⊂ C 0 and C 1 ⊂ C 1 be such that C 0 and C 1 have at least two elements each. We will call these two databases the working databases. The main idea is to construct an image mosaic using the tiles in DB and, at the time of embedding information, use the tiles in C 0 and C 1 for the substitution. This means that all we should do is to redefine the embedding and extracting function in the following way:
with j = 0, 1.
One of the problems that arises using a restriction of the database is that the distribution probability of the tiles within the mosaic is not uniform on the entire database. Indeed, consider the case in which each working database contains two tiles. This means that the capacity of a mosaic composed by n tiles is n bits. Moreover, suppose that we have to embed an n-bit string into this mosaic. This means that all the tiles in the mosaic are substituted with the tiles in the working databases or, in other words, the resulting mosaic will be composed of at most four different tiles. Notice that this situation looks most 'strange' if the attacker knows that the database used by the parties to compose mosaics is large. This example shows that we have to take into account the distribution probability of the tiles used for hiding information with respect to the tiles contained in the entire database. In other words, the distribution of the tile images within the mosaic should be the same distribution of the images within the database. More precisely, let |C 0 | = |C 1 | = s and |C 0 | = |C 1 | = s, i.e. the sets C 0 and C 1 have size s and C 0 and C 1 have size s. Moreover, let us denote by n 0 (respectively, n 1 ) the number of tile images belonging to C 0 (respectively, C 1 ). Since the distribution of the images within the mosaic should be the same as the images within the database, the ratio between n 0 (respectively, n 1 ) and n must be equal to s /s.
Of course, this approach will save space for memorization but will reduce the capacity of each image mosaic because we can substitute only a fraction of the tiles in the mosaic. In particular, this scheme will reduce the capacity c of a mosaic M to cs /s.
Another possible solution to the problem of the modification of the probability distribution could be the following. It is possible to consider the image databases C 0 and C 1 as 'ordered' sequences of images, P 01 , . . . , P 0s and P 11 , . . . , P 1s , respectively. In this setting, we can define the embedding (respectively, extracting) function as f j (i) = P ji (respectively, g j (P ji ) = i). The idea is to pseudo-randomly permute the 'sequence' of images at each step, i.e. at the time of the modification of tile M t we use a pseudo-random number generator to construct two permutations σ t j (1) , . . . , σ t j (s), with j ∈ {0, 1}, of the elements in {1, . . . , s}. We then define the embedding (respectively, extracting) function for time t as f j (σ t j (i)) = P ji (respectively, g j (P ji ) = σ t j (i)). In other words, the databases at time t can be seen as the permuted sequences of images P 0σ t 0 (1) , . . . , P 0σ t 0 (s) and P 1σ t 1 (1) , . . . , P 1σ t 1 (s) , and the embedding and extracting are properly redefined. This means that we use a different working database for each block of information we have to embed. This will ensure that the distribution probability of the images within the mosaic and within the databases will be the same.
The basic problem with this solution is that the players need to share (and privately store) long seeds in order to generate sufficiently long pseudo-random permutations.
Avoiding the tiles database private memorization
In this section we show a further improvement to the space memorization of private information. In the scheme presented, the information the parties have to keep secret is the database of the images, with the fields added for the embedding and extracting functions. Of course the space problem arises for the presence of the images in the database. What we could do to reduce this space occupancy is to privately store the index of the database instead of the database itself. Of course, in this case, we should preprocess the index file of the database by adding a field containing a unique number for each image, instead of the database.
Notice that it is sufficient for our purpose to privately store the database's index only. Indeed, for the embedding phase, the information needed to compute the embedding function f is contained in the preprocessed index file, as we added a field containing a unique identifier for each image. At the same time, to compute the extracting function g, we have to extract some information from the image (the key) and search for this information in the index file that now contains the value of the function, too. Figure 7 shows the modified implementation of the embedding and extracting functions.
Moreover, as the index file only contains a succinct representation of the information contained in the database, its size will be dramatically smaller than the size of the database.
As a simple indexing technique, we can consider the hash value of each image. Of course we should consider collisionfree hash functions and construct an index composed of at least three fields, the hash value, the unique number associated to the image and a pointer to the image in the image database. If a collision occurs, there will be more than one tile, say T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T c , in the image database with the same key in the index and this could cause problems for the extracting phase. Recall that the embedding phase uses the unique number as a key for image lookup and thus no collision is possible for this phase. On the other hand, suppose that the information associated with an image P must be retrieved and P collides with T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T c . In this case, the collision can be simply resolved by checking which image among T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T c is 'equal' to P .
Notice that this technique should be applied in conjunction with the one presented in Section 3.2 using an index that points to a subset of images in the database. Algorithm Secure Embed(M,X ,k) 
Hiding private information
In the previous sections we have shown that it is possible to embed any binary string of length in a mosaic composed of n tile images if we have at least two classes of s images each and if is upper bounded by n log s. The secrecy is guaranteed by the fact that an attacker does not know the database, the embedding and extracting functions. We have also shown how to simply implement these functions by 'embedding' them in the database itself. This technique forces the users to locally (and privately) maintain a copy of the image databases. Notice that there should exist some embedding and extracting functions that do not need the database modification to be implemented (the functions should extract information directly from the images). If this is the case, the database could be public, but, for the privacy of the scheme presented in the previous section, the functions must still be private.
We put ourselves in a weaker model in which the functions are implemented using some characteristic of the single image, i.e. they do not depend on the database and, at the same time, are public. To assure the privacy, we will embed in the mosaic an encrypted form of the message.
Let X = x 1 , . . . , x be the message Alice wants to send to Bob. The users will exchange the message X using the algorithms presented in Figure 8 .
Even though the database and the functions are public, an attacker can extract Y (a pseudo-random string) using the Extract algorithm. If the encryption scheme is secure, then it is impossible for the attacker to infer information about the message X we have embedded in the image mosaic. Moreover, since Y looks completely random, the attacker cannot tell if some information has been hidden in the mosaic. Using this approach, of course, the users must share a common key k and this is the only information that the users must keep secret.
Enhancing the security of the embedding scheme
The protocols presented in the previous sections embed information in an image mosaic M = M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M n by substituting the first v tiles in the image for some v ≤ n. This means that, if an attacker believes that some information has been embedded into a mosaic, he is sure that this information is hidden in these tiles.
We have also shown how to embed private information by encrypting the message before the modification of the image. The protocol presented, in this case, does not modify the sequence of tiles changed by the embedding algorithm. Nevertheless, the amount of information that the users keep secret dramatically decreases.
The security of the scheme presented in Section 3.4 is based on the security of the underlying encryption scheme. Another simple way to improve the security of the scheme presented is by allowing the algorithm to select in a pseudorandom way the sequence of tiles to change.
Alice and Bob share a common random seed r that is used as input for a pseudo-random generator. Recall that the pseudo-random generator is a deterministic algorithm and thus given the same input will produce the same output sequence.
From this sequence of bits, the players can deterministically construct the same pseudorandom sequence of numbers ranging from 1 to n which is interpreted by Alice (respectively, Bob) as the sequence of indices for the selection of the images that will be modified (respectively, read) by the embedding (respectively, extracting) algorithm. This will assure the correctness of the decoding.
